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*E.L. Rev. 765 The Court of Appeal in Gough has ruled that banning orders made under the Football
(Spectators) Act 1989 are compatible with European Community law and the ECHR. In doing so, it
has upheld the decision of the Divisional Court in Gough & Smith v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire,
Miller v. Leeds Magistrates Court, Lilley v. Director of Public Prosecutions.
The facts and procedure in the lower courts
The Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”), which amends the Football Spectators Act 1989
(“the 1989 Act”), is the most recent in a series of legislative measures designed to combat football
hooliganism by British fans at home and abroad. Section 14B of the 1989 Act as amended provides
for the making of a banning order against a person who has “at any time caused or contributed to any
violence or disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere” if the court is:
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to
prevent violence or disorder in connection with any regulated matches.
Gough and Smith were alleged, on the basis of convictions for assault and police “profiles”
concerning their behaviour as part of a group of football hooligans, to have caused or contributed to
violence or disorder. Deputy District Judge Aujla in the Derby Magistrates Court imposed two year
banning orders on both Gough and Smith under section 14B of the 1989 Act. The orders applied to
areas within a radius of grounds at which Derby County were playing. Gough and Smith were
subsequently notified by the Football Banning Orders Authority (“FBOA”) that they must report to a
police station during regulated matches played abroad and surrender their passports. Their appeal to
the Divisional Court was rejected on the ground that the orders complied both with European
Community law and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 1950 (ECHR).1
The judgment of the Court of Appeal
Gough and Smith argued that the banning orders imposed on them were not justified on public policy
grounds and were therefore in breach of Community law, in particular *E.L. Rev. 766 Article 2 of
Directive 73/1482 which provided that Member State nationals who wished to go to another Member
State as recipients of services must be granted the right to leave their home Member State and have
issued or renewed a passport or identity card. The Court of Appeal3 addressed, first, the issue of
whether the right of free movement was subject to derogations on grounds of public policy; second,
whether such a derogation justified the banning orders; and, third, whether Article 8 ECHR had been
breached.
There was an exception on grounds of public policy to the right of free movement
The Court of Appeal ruled that Article 8 of Directive 73/148 enabled Member States to derogate from
the rights in Article 2 on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. The express
derogation in Article 46 E.C. permitting the special treatment of “foreign” nationals on such grounds
Page1
did not imply that a Member State could not impose non-discriminatory restrictions on free movement
on those grounds. For example, the High Court had jurisdiction under section 37(1) of the Supreme
Court Act 1981 to restrain a party from leaving the jurisdiction and require his or her passport to be
surrendered where this was necessary to prevent court proceedings being deprived of their purpose.4
The possibility of such restrictions had also been recognised by Council Resolution of 6 December
2001, which provided that countries with the legal possibility of preventing potentially disruptive fans
from travelling abroad should take all possible measures to do so.
The measures taken were proportionate to the legitimate aim of preventing football
hooliganism
The Court of Appeal ruled that section 14B of the 1989 Act was compatible with Community law
according to the test of proportionality adopted by Lord Clyde in De Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing 5 and cited by Lord Steyn in R v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly. 6
a) The objective of the banning orders was sufficiently important to justify restrictions
The Court stated that preventing football hooligans from taking part in violence and disorder in foreign
countries was an imperative reason of public interest which was capable of justifying restrictions on
their freedom of movement. However, the justification was not the need to protect nationals in other
Member States, since in Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financien 7 the Court of Justice had
ruled that Dutch restrictions on cold calling of consumers in other Member States could not be
justified by the protection *E.L. Rev. 767 of consumers in other Member States because this was not
a matter for the Dutch authorities. Instead, the Court of Appeal ruled that the restrictions were justified
by a number of factors relating to the United Kingdom's own interests in preventing hooliganism
abroad. First, since other Member States had requested the United Kingdom's help in preventing its
football hooligans from creating disorder at matches in their countries, it should as a matter of
international solidarity endeavour to comply with those requests. Second, hooliganism by English and
Welsh fans abroad tarnished the reputation of the United Kingdom. Third, hooliganism could lead to
the banning of English and Welsh clubs from international competitions, which would have serious
financial implications for those clubs and for associated businesses.
It is submitted that this aspect of the ruling in Alpine Investments , and its consequences in Gough,
are unfortunate. Directive 73/148 permits derogations on grounds simply of “public policy”, and the
threat of violence and disorder clearly constitutes “a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the
requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society” 8 so as to justify
restrictions on free movement. Moreover, since the rationale underlying the free movement of
persons is the creation of a single internal market, the protection of citizens of other Member States
should be as capable of justifying derogations as the protection of a Member State's own nationals. It
is true that proving the existence of a threat in another Member State will be more difficult, but in this
case the requests for assistance by other Member States could provide the necessary evidence. The
Alpine Investments approach also risks weakening the protection of public policy since it reduces the
scope for the home Member State, which is in the best position to identify and prove the risk posed by
its nationals, to impose restrictions on them. In addition, such an approach in this case is contrary to
Council Resolution of 6 December 2001 requiring Member States to prevent their own nationals
travelling abroad and participating in disorder there.
In Alpine Investments, the Court of Justice concluded that the ban on cold calling could be justified by
the maintenance of the good repute of the Netherlands financial markets because of the importance
of these markets to the financing of economic operations. However, the factors cited by the Court of
Appeal to justify the banning orders in Gough are not analogous. Neither international comity nor the
good repute generally of the United Kingdom have an identifiable economic impact, and indeed the
former supports the argument that public policy considerations should include the impact on other
Member States. The financial interests of the football sector are more compelling, but exclusion from
European competitions would only affect the limited number of clubs (and associated businesses)
which would have qualified, and therefore there would be no substantial or widespread impact on the
British economy.
b) The imposition of the banning orders was proportionate to the objective
The Court considered that the test in De Freitas required the banning orders to have been imposed
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after giving individual consideration to each appellant, not to have been based simply upon the
criminal record of each appellant, to be rationally connected to the *E.L. Rev. 768 objective of
preventing English football hooliganism abroad, and to be no more than necessary to achieve this
objective.
The Court concluded that the 1989 Act clearly required consideration to be given to the individual
during the making of a banning order. First, the magistrates court must be satisfied that the person
had caused or contributed to violence or disorder and that the order would help to prevent violence or
disorder. Second, when considering whether to impose travel restrictions on a banned person, the
FBOA must give his case individual consideration. It is submitted that although section 19(2D)
allowed it to impose restrictions on a class basis and in practice they were so imposed, the fact that
these restrictions resulted directly from the imposition of an individually considered banning order
satisfied the requirement of individual consideration overall. Third, an individual subject to restrictions
on travelling abroad could seek exemption from them and, if he did so, individual consideration would
be given to his case. The Court was also satisfied that the banning orders had not been based simply
upon the criminal record of each appellant.
Although the Court concluded that the measures were connected to the objective of preventing
English football hooliganism abroad and were no more than necessary to achieve it, since a person
likely to get involved in violence or disorder at domestic matches was as or more likely to do so at
matches abroad, it disagreed with the assertion of the Divisional Court that the failure of previous
measures to prevent hooliganism by English fans abroad automatically demonstrated that the more
radical measures of the 2000 Act were proportionate. Indeed the Court of Appeal made a number of
criticisms of the amendments to the 1989 Act introduced by the 2000 Act. The nature of the facts to
be proved and the applicable standard of proof when the magistrates considered whether there were
“reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or
disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches” under section 14B of the 1989 Act
were unclear. The meaning of “special circumstances” and the applicable standard of proof when the
FBOA considered whether there were special circumstances justifying a banned person going abroad
and meaning that such a person would not attend matches were also unclear, and the onus of proof
was on the banned person. The provisions were therefore open to an interpretation which would be
disproportionate.
However, the Court of Appeal concluded that the question was not whether the statutory provisions
could give rise to a disproportionate effect but whether they could give rise to a proportionate effect,
and that they could. This approach must be correct, since if national law can be interpreted in line with
Community law, national courts are obliged to interpret it in that way, regardless of whether another
interpretation is possible.9
The Court considered that the provisions were capable of being applied proportionately because, first,
a banning order should only be imposed where there were compelling grounds to conclude that the
subject had a propensity to take part in football hooliganism. This reflects the approach of the Court of
Justice when assessing whether restrictions on grounds of public policy are justified by criminal
convictions.10 Second, it was *E.L. Rev. 769 proportionate that such persons be required to obtain
permission to travel abroad when prescribed matches were taking place, and to prove that their
purpose was other than attendance at such matches. The public policy objective would not be met by
lesser measures. Third, a reverse burden of proof was not incompatible with Community law or the
ECHR.11 The object of the foreign travel was likely to be within the exclusive knowledge of the banned
person, and its proof should not be difficult so long as an appropriate standard of proof was applied.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court that the proceedings in which banning orders
were imposed were civil proceedings, and that orders were not penalties. However, although the civil
standard of proof technically applied when assessing whether there were “reasonable grounds to
believe” that a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder, the Court of Appeal ruled
that this standard was flexible and must reflect the serious consequences for citizens' freedom that an
order had. The necessity of imposing a restriction upon a fundamental freedom must be strictly
demonstrated, and the standard of proof applied should be “hard to distinguish from the criminal”.12
The Court considered that such a standard was possible under the section 14B regime. First, section
14B(4)(a) required that the person be proved to have “caused or contributed to any violence or
disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere”, a standard of proof that was virtually indistinguishable
from the criminal. Second, section 14B(4)(b) required that there be reasonable grounds to believe that
making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any
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regulated football matches. The reasonable grounds would almost inevitably consist of past conduct,
which must be such as to make it reasonable to conclude that if the person was not subject to a
banning order, he was likely to contribute to football violence or disorder in the future. The conduct
need not be football related but must be proved to a strict standard of proof and be such that if the
person were not banned, he would attend matches and take part in violence and disorder. Third,
section 20(4) of the 1989 Act required the FBOA to exempt the subject of a banning order from
restrictions on foreign travel if there were “special circumstances” which justified the exemption and
indicated that he would not attend matches if exempted. The phrase “special circumstances” should
not be interpreted as extraordinary circumstances, and provided that the reason for travel was other
than attendance at a prescribed match, permission should be granted. The FBOA should merely
satisfy themselves on a balance of probabilities that this was the case, and indeed the facts indicated
that this had been its approach. All of the 80 or so applications made so far had been granted,
including one by Gough himself.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the District Judge (Magistrates Court) had failed to apply the
appropriate standard of proof. His ruling that the civil standard applied and that he need only have
grounds to believe that an order would help to prevent violence or disorder indicated that he did not
apply a sufficiently strict standard. However, the Court considered that this was unsurprising, since
the only argument before him was whether the civil or criminal standard applied and McCann 13 had
not yet been decided, and ruled that *E.L. Rev. 770 the profile of each appellant would in fact have
justified making an order had the strict standard been applied.
The banning orders did not breach Article 8 ECHR
The Court ruled that although a banning order might result in a breach of the right to respect for
private or family life under Article 8 ECHR, on the facts there had been no such breach. In any event,
such a breach would be likely to be justified under Article 8(2) as necessary for the prevention of
disorder.
The appeal was therefore dismissed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
Conclusion
This judgment is important for a number of reasons. First, it provides Court of Appeal authority for the
proposition that banning orders under section 14B of the 1989 Act are lawful as a matter of
Community law. This is despite the Resolution on hooliganism and the free movement of football
supporters, which states that only a conviction for violence or a football related offence should justify
a banning order.14
Second, the judgment also provides Court of Appeal authority for the proposition that the imposition of
the banning orders was in accordance with the ECHR. Although Gough and Smith did not appeal
against the ruling of the Divisional Court that the Article 7 ECHR prohibition on the retrospective
application of heavier penalties did not apply because the banning orders were not penalties, the
Court of Appeal nonetheless confirmed that this was correct. It also ruled that there had been no
breach of Article 8 ECHR.
Third, the judgment confirms that public policy restrictions on a Member States' own nationals may be
justified only by reference to its own interests. However, the latter are to be construed widely, and
may include its duty to co-operate with other Member States, its international reputation generally,
and the financial interests of a small sector with limited impact on other areas of the economy. While
the Court of Appeal cannot be criticised for following the judgment of the Court of Justice in Alpine
Investments, it is regrettable that the latter has excluded the protection of other Member State
nationals from public policy considerations. As argued above, this could adversely affect the
protection of public policy unless (and possibly even if) the artificial exercise of identifying some
internal interest for a Member State to protect is carried out. It is therefore to be hoped that the Court
of Justice reverses its position on this issue.
LLB (Hons), Solicitor, Senior Lecturer, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University.
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